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Some of the logical consequences of drawing a distinction be- 
tween the following two aspects of problem-solving behavior are 
explored: (a) actions directed toward the acquisition of i formation 
to guide future actions toward valuable goals; (b) actions directed 
toward the utilization of accumulated information to attain a val- 
uable goal. An experimental paradigm accomplishing this separation 
is described for the case of an environment of periodic sequences 
of binary events. A general way of describing behavioral strategies i
developed in terms of: (a) a plan for when to acquire information, to 
guess an outcome, or to guess at the solution; and (b) a program for 
how to compute guesses from the information accumulated. The 
structure of the binary environmental sequences, the structure of 
these behavioral strategies, and the relations between them are ana- 
lyzed, and certain strategies which maximize value are suggested. 
Computing machine interpretations of certain specific strategies for 
a restricted kind of experiment are displayed, and predictions from 
these are compared with experimental data from pilot studies per- 
formed with human subjects. 
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A Dual operator Ik Information accumulated up 
i Decision to request informa- to kth trial 
tion P0, • • ", PT, p, Probabilities 
x Decision to guess at a risk E~, EB, Ec Expectations for 
z Decision to offer a hypothesis strategies A, B, C 
sl, • •., sn Schedule, sk taking ~,/~ Constants 
three values, i, x, or z n, r, t, j, J, M, K Integers used 
xk Guess about kth trial for counting 
INTRODUCTION 
Our purpose in this paper is to describe a possible mechanism that can 
simulate the kind of behavior which is observed when a person thinks, 
particularly those aspects concerned with the gathering and use of 
information about a certain kind of problem to be solved. To this end, 
we shall discuss various hypothetical and actual experiments which 
refer to a particular and simple type of "thinking" (Bruner et al., 1956b; 
Galanter and Smith, 1957; Grant et al., 1951; Hake and Hyman, 1953; 
Humphreys, 1939). In a typical experiment of this kind, the subject 
(henceforth abbreviated by S, pural S's) is faced with an environment 
which is generating a sequence of binary events. Normally, the task of 
S is to anticipate which element of the binary alternative will occur on 
each trial. In some experiments he binary sequence is generated by a 
probability mechanism (e.g., repeatedly tossing a coin and asking the 
subject, before each toss, to guess the outcome) (Grant et al., 1951). In 
other experiments, the binary sequence is generated according to a re- 
current pattern (Galanter and Smith, 1957). Our analysis is primarily 
directed toward the latter class of experiments. 
To solve the kind of problem described above--that is, to discover the 
pattern of a periodic binary sequence--it is necessary that the subject 
acquire some information about the sequence; he must learn. We may, 
on the one hand, be interested in the plan or schedule that a person 
uses for acquiring the information he needs, if he is given freedom of 
choice in this. Or we may be interested in the manner in which hy- 
potheses (or molar responses) are generated and revised as the subject 
obtains more information. Schemes to describe and interpret these and 
other aspects of behavior modification appear invarious works (Guthrie, 
1935; Hull, 1943; Skinner, 1938; Tohnan, 1932), although only the 
second problem has received detailed attention (Hull, 1951, 1952). 
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Learning theory, however, is still in an early stage of development, and 
some of the fundamental ideas still need a good deal of clarification. 
In most experiments of this genre it is implicitly assumed that the 
acquisition of information is a by-product, or possibly an incidental 
result, of behavior aimed chiefly at maximizing the value of the outcome 
to the person. We assume the existence of a clear-cut distinction between 
decisions leading to value (profit) and decisions leading to the "pure" 
acquisition of information on which better future decisions may be 
based. For the latter kind of event, no choice between responses (at a 
risk) is required of the subject after he has elected to acquire informa- 
tion on a given trial. Essentially, we are complicating the standard 
paradigm of the decision-making experiment as illustrated in Fig. 1. 
At each trial, the subject is first required to choose between (a) collecting 
information about the coming event by just observing and recording it, 
and (b) deciding on a guess about the outcome of the coming event, at a 
risk. This choice is represented by the bottom node of the decision tree 
in Fig. 1. 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE GENERAL PROBLEM 
The following experiment will serve as a prototype of the tasks we will 
study. The experimenter tells the subject that a time series of binary 
events (for example, a light flashing alternately red and green) will be 
® () 
Outcome 
Primary Dec=s,on 
F~a. 1. Decision tree for the experimental paradigm 
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presented. On each trial the subject may guess what the next event will 
be. Since he may, at times, be unable to decide on an intelligent guess, or 
may have various degrees of confidence in his guess, we will allow him to 
attach a weight or a strength to each guess. This is realized experi- 
mentally by allowing him a choice of bets or odds on each of his predic- 
tions. 1 The possibility of betting nothing, i.e., not guessing, is permitted. 
This corresponds to the pure acquisition of information. A guess, on the 
other hand, may permit him to get a reward as well as to acquire infor- 
mation. But our original aim was to separate completely information- 
gathering from decision-making. To accomplish this aim, we deliberately 
avoid indicating to S the outcome of any decision-making choice that he 
selects. Thus, if he decides that the light will turn up red and makes a 
wager on this decision, he does not discover whether or not the light was 
red or green. His reward, or lack of reward, is accumulated and collected 
at the end of the experiment. Only on those trials when S elects to obtain 
information does he discover what the outcome of a decision trial would 
have been. This procedure is quite different from the procedure that has 
been employed in experiments of this kind up to the present ime. In M1 
of the experiments recorded so far, S has always discovered after making 
a choice which event occurred. With this paradigm, however, S only 
discovers which event occurs if he asks for information. If he makes a 
choice for which value can accrue to him, he does not discover the out- 
come. 
Inasmuch as the sequences to be presented to our S's will all be con- 
structed according to a recursive scheme or pattern, S will also be per- 
mitted to guess the entire pattern of the sequence. Bets, or strength of 
credibility in guesses about the whole pattern, are treated like bets or 
guesses about the next single event. The experiment ends when S indi- 
cates that he has grasped the pattern either by verbally stating what the 
sequence is or by correctly guessing the sequence several times in suc- 
cession, or both. 
When choosing the units to be used for bets and rewards, the problem 
of inter- and intrapersonal value becomes crucial. For instance, if the 
unit that we choose is one dollar, and statistics are gathered from a 
number of different S's, can the experimenter assume tha~ the inter- 
1 This idea is not developed in the theoretical discussion to follow, but we 
plan to explore the logical and experimental consequences of this problem in the 
future. The most recent work on this problem has been presented by Irwin et al. 
(1956). 
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personal variations in response to a gain or loss of one dollar are less 
than the variations for a single S?  Furthermore,  are the response varia- 
tions of a single S f rom one t ime to another less than the differences to 
be studied? These  are deep questions, and  ones for wh ich  we have  no  
readily available answer. The  current research in the field of value 
measurement  may eventually th row some light on these issues. For  the 
present discussion we s imply adopt  the conjecture that intrapersonal 
variations in the value of money  are zero and  that the value is mere ly  
a monoton ic  increasing (perhaps a linear or logarithmic) function of the 
amount  of money .  Mot ivat ion  level should fo rm at least an ordinal 
scale. The  selection of money  as a linear measure  of motivat ion has some 
experimental  support in the work  of Edwards  (1954). 
But, regardless of the choice of a measure,  the relation between de- 
cisions and  the particular value at stake will also depend upon a number  
of complex  situational factors. If, for example, S knows  that he will be 
al lowed a large number  of repetitions, he may try to max imize  his ex- 
pectation; but, if he is to be given only a single trial, he might try to 
maximize his likelihood of gain or to be guided by his "propensity to 
gamble." Questions of this kind may not necessarily be related to the 
scale of value that is employed. These questions can be subjected to 
direct experimental test, and indeed experiments by Mosteller and 
Nogee (1951) and the recent work on preference scaling by Luce and 
Raiffa (1957) and Davidson et al. (1955), are obviously related to this 
issue. Although these questions are of subsidiary interest to us here, the 
model that we will describe provides a technique that is intrinsically 
capable of exploring these motivational issues. 
The importance in controlling these motivational variables has been 
stressed by Galanter and Gerstenhaber (1956), who have shown that the 
form of the payoff unction, independently of the measure of the value 
of the payoff, can exert powerful influences over the behavior of people 
in environmental situations imilar to the ones we are describing here. 
But the experiments o which Galanter and Gerstenhaber (1956) refer 
are ones where the sequences are modulated by "noise," and the be- 
havioral situation may be quite different when S's task is to predict a 
recurrent pattern. In fact, Bruner et al. (1956a) present results that 
suggest that the effects of payoff unctions on behavior when the task of 
S is to predict patterns of binary alternatives is less important than other 
factors uch as the necessity for the subject o respond and the amount 
of noise in the binary pattern. 
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Let us assume that we have decided upon the units and scales of 
"reward" and that extrinsic motivational problems have been eliminated. 
The general procedure for our experiment is then as follows. On each 
trial there are three response alternatives available to the subject: (a). 
He may request information about the outcome of the next event at 
the cost of c units. (b). He may guess what the outcome of the next 
event will be with a reward of v units if right, and minus w units if 
wrong. He will not be informed of the outcome, and his rewards will be 
accumulated until all the trials are completed. (c). He may guess the 
periodic pattern with a reward of V units if right, and minus W units 
if wrong. 
The trial then is an occasion for one of the three response alternatives. 
For any given experiment the subject may or may not be restricted to a 
fixed number of trials, and he may or may not be permitted to record and 
externally store acquired information. 
The choice of particular binary alternatives--whether r d or green 
lights, left or right key, etc.--with respect o the prior history of the 
subject may be an important factor in the control of his choice. How- 
ever, the diversity of alternatives that have been used, with essentially 
identical results, suggests that this variable is probably not crucial. More 
important is the subject's anticipation of what sort of "scheme" nature 
or the experimenter is using. This must be controlled by adequate in- 
structional "tuning." Some of this tuning is, of course, accomplished by 
the use of explicit payoff functions. 
CLASSIFICATION OF SEQUENCES 
In the present context, the word sequence refers only to the pattern 
of a periodic sequence of events. We shall define "pattern" later on. Let 
k = 0, 1, 2, . . -  denote the number of the trial on which a decision is 
made, and y~ the outcome (known or unknown to the subject) of the 
subsequent event. Here yk can take the values 0 or 1, these symbols 
being unrelated to the real numbers so designated. The sequence 
[yl, y2 , ' "  "], abbreviated as y, is generated by the experimenter or a 
machine. I t  is assumed to be of finite length, but there is no upper 
bound on length. These binary sequences may be divided into two broad 
categories. 
Category I :  All sequences that can be uniquely generated by a finite 
set of rules of a recursive nature shall be called inductive sequences, uch 
as: 0101101110111101111101111110 . . . .  
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Category P: All sequences which satisfy the relation yk+~ = yk for all 
k greater than or equal to some/~0 and some k are called periodic sequences. 
They are specified by k, y l ,  • • • , Yk0, and any k successive values of yk 
of a single period. An example of a periodic sequence is: 
1011011011011 . . . .  The class of all periodic sequences i included in the 
class of all inductive sequences. 
The remainder of this paper will be confined to sequences of Category 
P. The integer k0 shall be called the phase of the sequence. For theoretical 
purposes, we imagine that the sequence xtends infinitely to the right 
and to the left in the sense stated above [called a "bisequence" by 
Gottschalk and tIedlund (1955)], so that k0 indicates the trial number at 
which periodicity begins, starting to count the trial number at an arbi- 
trarily selected trial. We label this trial "0" and from this point on move 
to the right. 
Formally, two sequences (y and y') shall be called T-equivalent 2 if one 
can be obtained from the other by a translational shifting of the digits. 
For example, the sequences 
011011011 
110110110 
are T-equivalent. The transformation, T ~,  called a right-shift (or left- 
shift) of n digits, is defined by: T+~yk ' and T -n ' = y~+n,  Yk = yk -~.  
I t  is obvious then that for any periodic sequence of period },, T+Xyk = 
yk+x and T-×y = yk-x,  for all k, y being regarded as doubly infinite. 
In other words, sequences which differ only in phase are regarded as 
equivalent provided that yl ,  " '"  , Yk0 is part of the pattern in a period. 
The complement of yk, denoted by 9k, is defined as 9k = 1 if Yk = 0 
and asgk = 0i fy~ = 1. 
The transformation A applied to a sequence [yl, y2, ys, • • • ] is defined 
by [~i, ~ ,  ~s, " " ] .  Two sequences are called A-equivalent or comple- 
mentary if one can be obtained from the other by a A-transformation. 
For example, 
01101101 
10010010 
Some of these concepts are similar to the ones introduced by Morse and 
Hedlund (1940), although they were developed quite independently in the present 
context. 
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are A-equivalent to each other. The following results are then readily 
established: 
(1) A(ay) = y; 
(2) If y and yP are T-equivalent then Ay and Ay t are T-equivalent also; 
(3) AT±~y = T±nAy. 
For every X it is obvious that there are 2 x sequences. But it is possible 
to find a smallest set of sequences (specified by a single period) that can 
generate all of the 2 × sequences for any given ~ by applying combinations 
of the transformations T and A one or more times to some element in 
that set. This smallest set of elements that will generate all of the se- 
quences for any X will be called the minimal generating set for X, abbre- 
viated rags. The rags for any X is not uniquely defined, but the number 
of elements in that set F(X) is an invariant. In other words, there may 
be more than one set of F(X) sequences from which all possible sequences 
of period X can be obtained by shifting and complementation. Another 
point that should be noticed is that in the 2 ~ sequences of period X there 
are included all those sequences whose periods are integral divisors of X. 
Thus, a l though. . .  0101010101...  is basically a sequence of period two, 
with the pattern 01, it is also periodic with period four, with the pattern 
0101, etc. The rags for any X does not include those patterns that are 
included in the rags for any integral divisors of X. 
Abelson has shown that the number of elements in the rags for prime X 
is given by the following formula: 
F(X) = (2 ×-~ -- 1)/X 
This number is also an upper bound for any nonprime X. N. J. Fine has 
recently succeeded in analytically evaluating F(X). The formula is: 
1 ~ u(d) 2 X F(x) = ~ 
where d I X are the odd integral divisors of X and the function u(d) is the 
Moebius inverse function (Hardy and Wright, 1954). 
In addition to the analytic determination of the number of elements 
in the mgs for any X we also have an inductive method for generating the 
mgs for every X starting with X = 1. This inductive method and a list 
of the mgs for all X from 1 to 15 can be secured from the authors on 
request. 
Two sequences will be called equivalent when they are either T-equiva- 
lent or A-equivMent or both. This definition of sequence quivalence is
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a true equivalence relation. Thus, the set of all 2 x periodic sequences of 
period k can be partitioned into F(k) equivalence classes. Each equiva- 
lence class shall be called a pattern. 
Whether the definitions of T- and A-equivalence are psychologically 
meaningful is subject, of course, to empirical verification. Some pre- 
liminary results of our research to date indicate that the A-equivalence 
relation is a true psychological equivalence, in the sense that the median 
number of trials for solution of A-equivalent sequences appears to be 
approximately equal. 
Four S's were given the opportunity to predict a particular pattern 
several times under both conditions of the transformation. The data in 
Table I shows the similarity in the number of trials that were needed 
for the two conditions. 
STRATEGIES 
The prototypieal experiment that we outlined in the second section 
is essentially a problem-solving task. There are three different alterna- 
tives open to the individual who faces this task: requesting information, 
guessing the next outcome at a risk, and guessing the pattern at a risk. 
For any particular sequence of trials, there are many possible combina- 
tions of these types of acts. Ignoring the question of whether or not a 
"conscious" plan guides the decision-making procedure at each trial, 
it is assumed that the choices are made according to a plan. Such a plan 
shall be called a strategy. It  differs mainly in degree from a relatively 
"stochastic decision-making procedure," as might be observed in the 
behavior of rats in a T-maze. The latter type of behavior seems best 
described by certain kinds of stochastic processes (Bush and Mosteller, 
1955), whereas a computerlike mechanism in which random elements 
play a secondary role seems a more fruitful model for "planned" be- 
TABLE I 
PSYCHOLOGICAL CORROBORATION OF A-EQUIVALENCE 
Sequence [y] Subject Number of Medianto correcttrials Medianto correcttriais 
observations prediction for y prediction for Ay 
0001010011 A 8 26 30 
0000000001 B 6 16 20 
0101000011 C 4 27 18 
0001000001 D 7 12 11 
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havior (Polya, 1954). Elsewhere (Galanter and Gers~enhaber, 1956), we 
have called this type of behavior recursive. Before such models of re- 
cursive behavior can be constructed, we need to present he basic logical 
concepts in a mathematical form; i.e., to develop a precise definition for 
the notion of "strategy." 
Consider a set of 3 elements/ i ,  x, z}. The symbol i represents the sub- 
ject's decision and/or action to request information; his decision and/or  
action of guessing at a risk is denoted by x; his choice of offering a par- 
ticular hypothesis about the pattern is denoted by z. For any k, before 
the kth trial, the subject picks one of these 3 alternatives. Denote his 
choice by sk. 
SCHEDULES 
An ordered sequence sl ,. • • , s~ of choices hall be called a schedule of 
length n. There are clearly 3" schedules of length n, and there are 
1/~(3~°+1 -- 3) schedules of length less than or equal to no. In order to 
develop a heuristically useful nomenclature, let us consider a few sched- 
ules. As our first example, consider the schedule s~ = i;/~ = 1, 2, • • • , n. 
This yields the schedule 
i i i . . . i  
n 
that is, a request for information on each tr ia l  This will be called a 
pure question-schedule of length n. Now consider the schedule sk = x; 
k = 1, 2, • • • , n. This schedule requires a guess at a risk on every trial. 
This will be called a pure gambling-schedule of length n. As a third 
example, consider sk = z;/c -- 1, 2, . - .  , n. This schedule represents a 
guessed hypothesis on each trial and will be called a pure pattern-guess- 
ing schedule of length n. 
These examples illustrate the three extremes. Under very rare circum- 
stances would any one of these particular schedules be appropriate. But 
certain properties of these schedules are quite simple to examine. In a 
pure gambling-schedule of length n, with 
Pr [xk = 1] = Pr [x~ = O] = 1/~, 
the expected value is ]/~n(v - w), because the probability of xk being a 
correct guess is 1/~ for each k. An obvious corollary is that if v equals w, 
the expected value is zero, as would seem intuitive. 
INFORMATION IN PROBLEM SOLVING 277 
A large and important  class of schedules is i l lustrated by this example: 
s~ = i, k = 1,2,  . . . , r ;  
s~ = x, k = r + 1, . . . ,n .  
Here, information is acquired for the first r trials and guessing takes 
place during the last n - r trials. This will be called an informed guessing 
schedule with parameters (r, n). I f  
sk = i, k = 1, - - . , r ;  
sk ~- x ,  tc = r i -  1 ,  . . .  ,n  - 1,  s~ = z 
then the schedule shall be called a simple combined strategy (r, n). We 
shall now examine some of these schedules in more detail. 
PROGRAMS 
We regard the acquisition of information as useless unless it is em- 
ployed in guessing or hypothesizing the pattern. We define a program 
associated with an informed guessing schedule as a set of n -- r func- 
tions, which specify a plan for utilizing the information, Yl, " '"  , yr,  
acquired during the first r trials of an informed guessing schedule, 
xk  = f~(y l ,  " " ,  y r ) ,  k = r -}- 1,  . . . ,  n .  There are 2 (~-~)'~ different 
programs associated with an informed guessing schedule for a fixed n and 
r. This is so since the set of n - r functions can be regarded as a single 
mapping of the set of all 2" combinations of y l ,  . . -  , yr into the set of 
all 2 ~-r combinations of xr+~, " - ' ,  xn. There are obviously 2 (~-r)'2~ 
mgppings from a set of 2 ~ elements into one of 2 ~-~. Here, and hence- 
forth, a subscript/~ will be appended to the symbol x to signify that, in 
addition to having chosen to guess rather than request information or 
hypothesize, the subject makes the guess x~ = 0, or x~ = 1 on the kth 
trial. 
The structure of a program can be seen more easily by considering a
few examples. Suppose we let n = 4 and r = 3. Then S will request 
information for the first three trials, and the program must assign a 
value of zero or one to the fourth trial. This value is the subject's guess 
or prediction. For this case the values of (y~, y2, y3) can be one of the 
eight sequences: 
000 001 010 100 011 101 110 111 (Yl, y2, y~) 
0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 (x~) 
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and some one of the 2(~' ~)'2r or 256 programs might be the alternatives 
listed below each triple. That  sequence of binary digits associated with 
each of the 256 programs for the above example can be stated as the 
decimal equivalent integer (q). In this case and for this program q = 105. 
Hence an informed guessing program has as its parameters the two 
integers r and q. 
Another program with r = 3 but with n = 5 might be the program 
r = 3, q = 10391. The binary expansion of 10391 is 
00 10 10 00 10 01 01 11 
Thus x4 and x5 are determined by associating one pair from this program 
with each possible yl ,  y2 , Y3 • 
A most general kind of schedule is illustrated by: 
i i i i x i i xxxx i ixxz ixxxzz ixxz .  
I t  is typical of those used by some S's under certain conditions. I t  shall 
be called a mixed Schedule. The manner in which such a schedule is gen- 
erated may be expressed by a function of the form: 
sk = g(s~- l  , . "  , s l ,  Ik_~) 
where Ik-~ is the information which has been accumulated up to the kth 
trial. For instance, if sk_~ = z and the hypothesis turns out to be false, 
this item of information is contained in Ik-~, and consequently, sk = i. 
Another function g' could have assigned sk = x to this situation. Note 
that it is still necessary for the program to specify what the value of x 
is: xk  = f ( I k -~) .  Heuristically, this schedule determines, on the basis of 
past information, what the independent variables in the program func- 
tion will be, and the program computes the response on the basis of the 
values of these independent variables. 
The question arises as to which strategies are in some sense optimal. 
One sense might be to maximize the expectation; another to maximize 
the likelihood, and so on. The act of acquiring information, unmixed 
with the possibility of gain by the same act, should be one or more trials 
removed from a gainful act. In other words, a useful item of information 
acquired on the/~th trial may (a) increase the probability of gain at one 
or more future trials above what it would have been without this infor- 
mation, or (b) generate information which can do (a). If it does neither 
(a) nor (b), it is not profitable to acquire information on that trial. 
Consider the case where the experimenters guarantee the subject 
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TABLE I I  
COMPARISON OF THE GAINS OF THREE STRATEGIES, 
A,  B,  C FOR A SEQVENCE OF PERIOE 3 
Gains for schedule 
Sequence A, xxx* B, iixt C,~xx$ 
po 000 3v v--2c 2v--c 
p~ 001 v --v--2c --c 
p2 010 v v--2c --c 
p~ 011 --v --v--2c --2v--c 
p4 100 v --v--2c --2v--c 
p5 101 v v--2c --c 
p6 110 --v --v--2c --c 
p7 111 --3v v--2c 2v--c 
* Program: 000. 
Program: y~ ~ yl = x3 ; yl = y~ = x3 . 
:~ Program: yl = x2 = x3. 
a pr io r i  that  0-runs and 1-runs of length 3 are extremely likely. In  order 
to maximize the expectation, the schedule of length 3, i xx ,  with the 
program xa -- x2 = yl is optimal, the expected gain being 2v - c, with 
probabil ity near 1. To be sure, by using a pure gambling schedule, say 
xxx  = 000, the gain can be 3v, but  only with probabil ity 1/~. Where the 
situation "2v -- 1 with probabil ity near 1" is preferable to the situation 
"3v with probabil ity ]/~ and -3v  with probabil ity 1/{,,, the first strategy 
is better than the gambling strategy. If, however, information about the 
runs had not  been furnished a pr ior i ,  the gains associated with each of 
the eight possible sequences of length three under three different strate- 
gies would be as shown in Table I I .  The probabilities with which the 
various sequences occur are denoted by p0, " "  , p~. The expectations 
corresponding to the three strategies are: 
EA = v[3(p0 -- pT) -k (pl ~- P2 -k p4) -- (p3 q- p5 q- p6)] 
E.  = v[(po + p2 + p5 + pT) - (p~ + p~ + p~ + p6) ]  - 2c 
Ec  = 2v(po + pT --  p3 --  p4) - c 
I t  is readily seen that  if all the p's are equal, E~ = 0, Es  = --2c, and 
Ec  = -c .  As long as c is greater than zero, A is the best of the three in 
the sense of maximizing expectation. If c = av and 0 < Pl -9 p~ + pa q- 
P6 < ]/~, 0 < ~ < 1/~ _ (pi  -~ p~ @ p4 -~ pc), then B is "good"  in the 
sense that  EB > 0. 
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We might, therefore, conjecture that A is the best strategy if no a 
priori information about the sequences i available. This is true only for 
short sequences, however. For n much greater than three, acquired 
information begins to generate new information about the sequence, i.e., 
the acquired information suggests and partially confirms statements 
such as "runs of length three are very likely." Clearly the "closer" a 
sequence is to appearing randomly generated, the less valuable informa- 
tion-gathering is likely to be. In the design of experiments with n fixed, 
n should be sufficiently large to make information-gathering profitable, 
but not so large that the subject need not deliberate on his strategy. 
Under what conditions is it better to let sl = z than to let s~ = i? 
To answer this question, let p be the probabil ity that the subject guesses 
the pattern correctly. I t  is preferable, in the sense of maximizing the 
expectation, to use s~ = z if p >= (w - c ) / (w ~ v), for it is required 
that pV -- (1 - p)W >= -c  or p(V  Jr W) >= W - c. There are, of 
course, numerous other results on optimal strategies which can be ob- 
tained without difficulty. Rather than inventing criteria for optima, and 
then explaining the deviation of actual behavior from these strategies, 
it seems more fruitful to build upon assumptions which are supported by 
data, and if these data are unavailable, to design experiments to obtain 
them. 
To conclude this section, it might be useful to suggest one way of 
classifying strategies based upon the extent to which their programs 
utilize the information made available by their schedules. Let f be a 
program for an informed guessing schedule, which assigns to every 
(yl, " "  , yr) a unique (xr+l, - ' .  , xn). An independent variable yi is 
said to be vacuous if the value of (xr+~, . • • , x~) ---- x is unchanged when 
y~ is changed. If  only ~ of the r variables are nonvacuous for a given 
program, this program is said to be lOOfl/r per cent "cognizant."  
A POSSIBLE MECHANIS1V[ 
When a description of human behavior eaches a certain level of com- 
plexity it is often difficult to see the ramifications of the description. Two 
courses of action are open. We can work out the mathematical problems 
in detail, and thus generate theorems that will presumably describe 
additional behavior. We can also program a high speed computer with 
the axiomatic structure and operate it under a variety of parametric 
values for the system. Should some striking behavior occur we can refer 
to experiments performed with people to assess the worth of the model. 
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Computer programming has another valuable quality; the model may 
show us how to construct more capable computers. 
With this in mind we ask the question how might a computer be 
programmed to simulate the kinds of behavior we have discussed. If  we 
turn our attention to this problem we face the unhappy fact that the 
only data we have are from experiments where information-gathering 
and guessing at a risk is mixed. In other words, the experimental results 
from human subjects are all of the kind in which the person guesses which 
binary event will occur, and is immediately informed of the outcome. 
In addition, these experimental results do not incorporate control over 
the payoffs, and therefore factors of differential mental "set" or expecta- 
tion, are uncontrolled. Why then concern ourselves with the problem at 
all? The obvious answer is that we do have some data, and the techniques 
that  we suggest may be extendable when more experimental information 
does come to hand. 
The problem to which we direct our remarks concerns a person facing 
an environment that can generate one of two binary events at each trial. 
The subject is asked to anticipate which event will occur. The sequence 
of events is determined by a periodic pattern, and this information is 
known to S. We presume that S is interested in correctly predicting the 
pattern, even though we do not exercise control over this interest. To 
realize a program which utilizes all the information up to the kth trial, 
that is, one of the form xk  = f (y l ,  " ' "  , yr - -1)  in which none of the y's 
is vacuous, requires k - 1 or more bits of storage. Let us first consider a 
mechanism 3 with an indefinitely large storage, and a program which will 
minimize the number of trials that is required to predict the pattern 
perfectly. In addition we will assume nearly instantaneous computation 
time. This kind of machine sets a lower limit or base line to the kind of 
behavior we might expect from people. I t  will be useful to examine this 
"ideal" machine so that a more realistic model can be compared and 
contrasted with it. 
If S (in this case a computing machine) is not informed about any of 
the properties of the sequence, he would probably guess at random until 
the information that he acquires begins to provide clues about the 
pattern. One possible way to detect such clues in a minimum number of 
steps is as "follows. Notice first that with an unbounded storage capacity, 
the only relevant information is the length of the pattern ),. I f  all past 
3 Suggested by R. R. Bush. 
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events are stored and ~ is known, it is only necessary to count back k 
trials and repeat he stored pattern. Let us use an example to show how 
the machine works. Suppose the pattern to be found is ...00110011- 
0011 . . . .  At k = 0 the machine selects a response at random and stores 
the response and the event. Suppose they are both zero. The machine is 
designed to test the hypothesis that k is the smallest integer that has not 
been contradicted by the test function to be described. Therefore, on the 
hypothesis that ~ = 1 the machine predicts a 0. The machine will now 
have stored: 
k - -12  
events (y) = 0 0 
responses (x) = 0 0 
I t  applies to this information the following test function: 
k acceptk = n if t = 0 
t =~=0  (x~--y~)~ reject k = n if t > 0 
where n is the smallest integer not yet rejected as a hypothesis on the 
value of ~,. On the next trial the machine predicts 0, the test function 
becomes positive and k = 2 is tried. This will also be rejected, since it 
leads to a positive value of t; so the next k is tried, and the machine 
predicts 0. This will result in rejecting k = 3 and will lead to a prediction 
of 0 with the hypothesis that ), = 4. From this point on the machine 
will never fail with this pattern. Another example indicates that the 
plausible intuition, namely, that the machine will always be correct 
from k ~ 1 on, is false. If  the sequence is: 
k = 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
events = 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 
responses = 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 
the machine predicts, for example, 0 in trial 1, is correct and predicts 0 
again. I t  will reject ~ = 1 and try ~ = 2, predicting 0 for trial 3. This is 
correct and therefore on trial 4 it predicts 1 and is incorrect. I t  sets k - 3 
and predicts 1 and is correct. With the hypothesis that k = 3 it predicts 
0 for trial 6, is correct and predicts 0 for trial 7. This causes rejection of 
= 3 and k = 4, so that k = 5 is the next hypothesis tested. This is 
correct and so from trial 8 on, it will make no more mistakes. 
Psychologically, of course, such a program is unrealistic unless S is 
permitted auxiliary storage, since immediate memory is rather small. 
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Even with such storage it is still unl ikely that  S will have access to all 
the stored information within the t ime al lotted for the choice. For this 
reason, therefore, we will suppose that  there is a tendency to utilize no 
more information than is necessary, a lthough this is probably  false 
(Bruner et al., 1956 b). This principle leads to a different kind of com- 
put ing scheme, one that  utilizes simple associations and similarities 
rather than extensive memory  and test functions. 
At k = 1 the computer  will record the fact that  y2 followed Yl (for 
example, that  0 followed 0, or that  0 followed 1, or that  1 followed 0, 
or that  1 followed 1). At  k = 3 record that  y3 followed y2 ; if//1 = y2 ~ Y3, 
abandon this procedure. In  general then, if the association y~-, y~'+l is 
the same as a previous association and has the same first value as y j ,  
accept the hypothesis that  whenever yj appears, yj+l follows. The earliest 
point at  which this hypothesis can be offered is at k -- 4, although it is 
still not very plausible, since no association pair  will have been repeated. 
For  example, if y~ = 010101, • • • , a typical  successful program might  be 
the following: 
k = 1: guess at  random: Pr  [xl = 1] -- Pr  Ix1 = 0] = 1/~.9; learn that  
yl = 0. 
k = 2: guess at  random: Pr  Ix2 = 1] = Pr  Ix2 = 0] = 1/~; learn that  
y2 = 1, and store the association "a 1 follows a 0"  [notationally, 
(0--* 1)]. 
]¢ = 3: guess at random: Pr  [x3 = 1] = Pr  [xa = 0] = 1/3, and learn that  
y3 = 0, and store the association (0--~ 1). On the basis of this 
association, choose x4 = i, and learn that  this is correct. This 
association (0--* 1) becomes more "credible." 
]c = 5: since y4 = 1, search for an association beginning with 1. The 
association (1--~ 0) indicates the choice Y5 = 0. Learn that  this 
is correct and at tach more "credibi l i ty" to (1--+ 0), possibly 
also to the association (0--+ 1) as a by-product.  
Note  that  the above program involves a storage of two items of in- 
formation, (0--~ 1) and (1-~ 0), or four bits of information. By  observing 
that  the pairs (0--~ 1) and (1--~ 0) are complementary,  a binary digit 
associated with the pair (0--~ 1) to indicate whether its complement is also 
an association or not, can effect a saving of one bit of storage. We could, 
therefore, store (0--+ 1)A instead of both pairs. 
For most  sequences the above simple program will, of course, not work. 
If, at  some ]c, an association can be formed which contradicts one previ- 
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ously stored, for example, (0-+ 1), (0--~ 0), as in y~ = 0010010 . . . ,  
the following association pairs might be tried: (y j-2, Ys-~ --* Y~'). Thus in 
y~ above, the three pairs (00---> 1), (01--+ 0), (10--+ 0) will have been 
stored by at least/~ = 5, and these suffice to generate the rest of the 
sequence. Consider as another example y~ = 0011001100 . . . .  By at 
least k --- 6 the four associations (00--~ 1), (01---> 1), (11--~ 0), (10--~ 0) 
(12 bits of storage) will have been made and will be sufficient o generate 
y3 • This storage requirement could be reduced by rewriting the associa- 
tions as (00--~ 1)~,, (01--~ 1)A, using only eight bits of information. In 
general, an association pair is of the form (yj_j,  Y j-J+1, • " , Y J-1 --~ y~) 
and J _-< ~, - 1. Thus, for y~, J = 1; for Y2 and Y3, J = 2 is sufficient. 
For Y4 -- 010010100101.. . ,  however, the minimum J that will suffice 
is J = 4. The pairs are (0100--~ 1), (1001--+ 0), (0010--~ 1), (0101--~ 0), 
and (1010-+ 0), and a correct solution cannot be obtained before k = 8 
or 9. Note that the last pair is redundant since it is possible to infer 
from (0101-+ 0) and the fact that the pattern 0100 occurs, that (1010---~ 0) 
is correct. In the general case ~ - 1 pairs, at most, are necessary to 
generate the sequence. 
Let K be the number of trials before which all the associational pairs 
necessary to generate y cannot be acquired, and let M be the number of 
pairs (including the binary digits with values "A" or "absence of A") 
that are stored. For example, with Y5 = 111000111000... ,  J = 3 will 
suffice; at/~ = 4, (111--~ 0) is formed; at/~ = 5, (1t0---> 0); at k = 6, 
(100--~ 0); at/~ = 7, (000--~ 1), and this is the complement of (111-+ 0); 
hence the symbol A is simply appended to (111---> 0). At k -- 8, the pair 
(001--> 1) could already be suspected as the complement of (110-~ 0). 
Thus, if at k = 8, the conjecture (110--~ 0)A and (100--~ 0)A is made, 
the entire sequence can be generated at /¢ greater than or equal to 8. 
Thus K might be taken as 8. For the case Y6 -- 111010111010111010..., 
however, K = 9, J = 4, and M = 6 and the pairs are (1110--> 1), 
(1101-~ 0), (1010--~ 1), (0101--~ 1), (1011-+ 1), (0111--> 0). As a final 
example consider Y7 = 1100111100110011110011001111 . . . .  Here 
J = 5, K -- 15, and M -- 7 and the pairs are (11001--+ 1)A, (10011-+ 1), 
(00111--+ 1), (01111-+ 0), (11110--~ 0), (11100--~ 0), (10011-+ 0)4. 
After this mechanism for predicting the points at which solutions 
would be reached was constructed, we tried the experiment with one 
highly sophisticated S. The S was, moreover, permitted to keep a written 
record of acquired information and knew that he was searching for a 
periodic pattern. The S was tested on the above seven sequences, each 
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TABLE I I I  
COMPARISON OF OBSERVED AND CALCULATED NUMBER OF TRIALS TO "DIscOVER" 
THE PATTERN IN PERIODIC SEQUENCES 
Sequence No. of trials to prediction Median Predicted (K) 
yl 01 3, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 5, 6, 6, 7 4 4 
y2 001 4, 5, 5, 5, 5, 6, 6, 6, 7, 8 5.5 5 
y3 0011 4, 4, 5, 5, 5, 6, 6, 7, 7, 8 5.5 6 
y4 01001 5, 6, 6, 6, 7, 8, 9, 9, 10, 11 7.5 8 
y5 000111 5, 6, 6, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 8, 8 7 8 
y6 111010 5, 6, 6, 6, 8, 9, 9, 9, 10, 11 8.5 9 
y7 1100111100 11, 11, 13, 14, 15, 15, 16, 16, 16, 17 15 15 
of which was repeated ten times. The order in which the 70 sequences 
were selected was randomized. The smallest number of trials at which 
the correct pattern was first suspected is indicated in Table I I I  for 10 
repetitions of each of the sequences. This pilot experiment, hardly to be 
considered conclusive evidence for the proposed program, does never- 
theless lend a certain plausibility to such a program. 
There are two steps which might make the above paradigm more 
realistic and therefore more useful as a description of this kind of be~ 
havior. 
(1) Instead of using association pairs of the form (yj_j ,  . . .  , yj-1 --~ 
Ys), pairs of the form (y]_j, Yj-J+I, • • • , Yj-1 --~ Yj, Ys+~, " " " , YJ+~-~) 
could be used. Thus, if J = ~ = N, a pair of this sort represents a recog- 
nition of the periodicity of the sequence. In a sense it is equivalent to N 
(or ~) such pairs of the previous simple kind. However, a sequence of 
digits like y j ,  . - . ,  yj+N--1 is a word, and might be stored as a unit 
depending upon the range of alternative words which may have to be 
stored as well. 
(2) The program outlined above would be used at the beginning to 
form simple pairs with J = 1; when these become contradictory, J q- 1 
would replace J and a new set of pairs with J = 2 (3, 4, - . . )  would be 
formed until consistency was obtained. The process of switching to pairs 
with J greater than 1 for ]c greater than four involves the storage of all 
the/~ -- 1 digits y~, - . -  , yk-x, in addition to the storage of the pairs. 
For this reason considerable scanning of the memory would be involved, 
and the program reduces to the one we discussed previously. Suppose, 
however, that J is a random variable, with a possible mean of two or 
three. Suppose further that if one value of J leads to contradictory pairs, 
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it will not be used again, and the J with the maximum likelihood is 
selected. The distribution of J depends upon these values of J which 
have been eliminated as leading to contradictions. It  is possible to devise 
a distribution for J and a mechanism for changing it as a function of 
the discarded J 's  so as to "explain" the strategies used by S's. 
Finally, if S's are not permitted memory aids, some assumptions must 
be made about the number of times an association pair has to be re- 
peated before it can be recalled. With regard to sequences Yl, "'" , Y4, 
consider the estimates of the number of trials that various pairs need in 
order to be remembered (Table IV). Compare this with the median 
values of K obtained for groups of about 20 S's and reported in (8). We 
might suppose that it will take fewer repetitions to remember a comple- 
mentary pair than an ordinary pair, so that if it takes four repetitions to
recall (00-* 1) the occurrence of (11-~ 0) takes the place of a repetition 
of the original pair. This means that two repetitions are all that are 
required for the recall of both pairs. Very crudely then, we might surmise 
that the number of repetitions necessary for recall in this case appears 
to be twice the number of items to be recalled. Thus for a sequence 
y = 0000100001. . . ,  for which J = 4 with (0000--~ 1), (0001-~ 0), 
(0010-* 0), (0100--* 0), (1000--~ 0), there are five items to be remem- 
bered. Thus, ten repetitions hould be required on the basis of the 
above speculation. This would lead to a prediction of k = 9 + 5(10) 
or 59 as with Y4 • This, however, is probably false because of the zero 
runs of length four (or the symmetry of 00100). These should take fewer 
than 10 trials to recall. 
TABLE IV 
ESTIMATED I~UMBER OF ASSOCIATION-PAIRS TO BE I:~EMEMBERED 
IN ORDER TO "D IscOVER"  PATTERNS 
No. of Predicted Median of Sequence Association pairs to remember repetitions 
of pairs (K) ca. 20 S's 
Yl 01 (0--* 1)A 2 7 5.5 
y2 001 (00--~ 1), (01-* 0), 3 14 14 
(10--;' O) 
Y3 0011 (00--* 1)A, (01--* 1)A 2 14 14 
Y4 01001 (0100--+ 1), (1001--~ 0), 7 50 49 
(0010-~ 1), (0101--, 0) 
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We have avoided dealing with the general problem of the structure of 
these binary sequences from the point of view of such general group- 
theoretic ideas as symmetry, reflection, and so on. This is not because 
we believe these ideas to be useless, but rather because they are un- 
doubtedly of extreme, and possibly intrinsic, importance. We bypass 
their consideration because we do not know how to identify their psy- 
chological counterpart, the "simplicity" of a pattern. Our own work 
indicates that simplicities of this kind are constantly introduced into 
these sequences, and that these factors do not reveal themselves in the 
analysis we have described. Most probably, those features that make for 
simplicity are idiosyncratic, in the sense that people develop short-cut 
recoding schemes based on the prevalence of such patterns in their en- 
vironment. But again, to defend this view, we are forced to assume that 
the way the world is chopped up is intrinsic to the person. This problem, 
i.e., the source of the simplicity of "symmetr ic" or "continuous" pat- 
terns, is both old and deep. There can be very little to say until we have 
information about the behavior of people at various ages, with suitable 
control over their "irrelevant" experience. The generality of these ob- 
servations is no guarantee that they can be dismissed by asserting that 
they are "built-in" or otherwise xternal to the problem as a whole. 
RECEIVED: May 19, 1958. 
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